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The global economy is experiencing a recession, which originated in the United States 
and is affecting developed and developing economies alike. Between the second and third 
quarter of 2001, the United States GDP growth rate decreased from 2.6 per cent to 1.2 per cent. 
For the same period, the European Union’s GDP growth rate declined from 2.4 per cent to 1.7 
per cent. For Latin America and the Caribbean the growth will fall from 4 per cent in 2000 to 1 
per cent in 2001.
A central issue regarding the current recession is whether it will be short lived or rather a 
protracted one. Identifying the nature of the recession will determine the type of macroeconomic 
policy to deal with this phenomenon. The type of macroeconomic policy advocated to deal with 
the current recession is mainly countercyclical. This involves the reduction in tax cuts and 
interest rates to stimulate spending and investment.
Exchange rate movements have been stable and have responded, so far, to leading 
macroeconomic indicators. For its part, the terms of trade variations are registering the decline in 
non-oil and oil commodity prices. For the majority of developing economies the decline in non­
oil commodity prices adds a further constraint to their potential economic performance. In the 
same vein, a decline in oil prices for non producer countries provides a respite in the efforts 
required to maintain the current account balance and, in some cases, a true ‘buffer stock’ 
mechanism for the government budget.
The recession is taking place as important institutional arrangements are being negotiated 
or implemented. The extension of the market access preferences of the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI) to garments under the Law of Commerce and Development may serve to develop 
textile industry and exports to the United States. At the same time the granting of the trade 
promotion authority to the executive branch of the United States government will erode part of 
the positive effects of the Law of Commerce and Development. The fourth World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference (Doha, Qatar, 9-14 November 2001) addressed 
several pressing issues for developing economies. Among the most relevant for Caribbean 
countries are the implementation of special and differential treatment, the small economies issue, 
the extension of export subsidies for developing economies, and the extension of a waiver to the 
European Union to maintain a preferential and discriminatory trading regime with African, 
Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) countries.
The impact of the recession on the Caribbean will depend on a number of factors. These 
include the length and depth of the economic slump in these major markets and other markets; 
the impact of the slowdown on capital and trade flows, particularly tourism receipts. The effect 
on commodity prices, the extent of countries’ scope for adjustment based on reserves and other 
variables and the dexterity in economic policy-making and management will also be crucial 
determinants of performance. Most likely, by hardening the balance of payments restrictions, the 
recession will force a tightening of the fiscal stance for Caribbean economies. This, in turn, may 
mean an increase in unemployment rates and decreases in output growth.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS  
2000-2001
Introduction
During 2000-2001, the global economy experienced a slowdown in growth. The decline 
in growth originated in the United States in the high technology industries and is affecting 
developed and developing nations alike. Between the second quarter of 2000 and 2001, the 
United States and the European Union GDP growth rates decreased from 2.6 per cent to 1.2 per 
cent and from 2.4 per cent to 1.7 per cent, respectively. For its part, between 2001-2000 Latin 
America and the Caribbean experienced a decrease of three percentage points in its growth rate 
(4 per cent to 0.9 per cent).
A key question that underlies the debate about the causes of the current recession is that 
of its duration. Does it correspond to the downward phase of the business cycle with a turning 
point expected within the near future or is it perhaps the reflection of structural imbalances and is 
likely to be long lived? The precise identification of the nature of the recession will determine 
the type of policies that should be followed in order to confront this economic phenomenon. As 
it currently stands, the policy actions and recommendations to revamp stagnant economies 
include expansionary monetary and countercyclical fiscal policies. Industrialised economies 
have opted for implementing tax cuts and engineering interest rate reductions. The tax cuts are 
aimed at increasing disposable income and providing a stimulus to spending. The interest rate 
reductions are geared towards increasing loans and investment which, through a multiplier 
process, would enhance economic activity. Paraphrasing John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), the 
objective is “to start the ball rolling” .
The current situation, the uncertainty that surrounds these issues and the rapidity and 
depth with which the recession is spreading have resulted in periodic downward revisions of the 
growth forecasts. For the year 2002, the United States, the European Union and Latin American 
and the Caribbean economies are expected to grow by 0.7 per cent, 1.4 per cent and 1.9 per cent, 
respectively.
The current recession is taking place at the same time that significant institutional 
arrangements are being negotiated or implemented. The Law of Commerce and Development 
extends to garments part of the preferential market access granted by the CBI to other export 
products from Central American and Caribbean countries. The adoption of the Trade Promotion 
Authority by the United States Congress gives a broader authority and mandate to the executive 
branch of the United States to change trade agreements. This could be a stumbling block for the 
regional development of the export sector. The Doha Ministerial Conference (Qatar, 9-14 
November 2001) launched a new round of trade negotiations. The new trade agenda incorporates 
a series of issues of relevance to Caribbean economies. Among these are the implementation of 
special and differential treatment, the issue of small economies, the extension of export subsidies 
and the waiver allowing the European Union greater time limits to extend its preferential trading 
regime with ACP countries.
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The precise impact of the recession especially in the wake of 11 September, and the 
slowdown in economic growth on the Caribbean will depend on a number of factors. These 
include the length and depth of the economic slump in these major markets and other markets; 
the impact of the slowdown on capital and trade flows, particularly tourism receipts. The effect 
on commodity prices, the extent of countries’ scope for adjustment based on reserves and other 
variables and the dexterity in economic policy-making and management will also be crucial 
determinants of performance.
This document analyzes the most significant global developments that have taken place 
in 2000-2001 with a view to provide an overall picture of the international context facing 
Caribbean economies in the short run.
The document comprises seven sections. The first one examines the weakening of global 
growth prospects. The second section focuses on the debate surrounding the nature of the United 
States recession. The third section describes the type of policy responses that industrialised 
countries have and plan to undertake to confront the current recession. The fourth section deals 
with exchange rate and terms of trade developments. Exchange rates have responded to ‘news’ 
about leading economic indicators, which could provide some clues regarding the nature and 
significance of the recession. For its part, the terms of trade (the ratio of the prices of exports to 
that of imports) are affected by two opposing tendencies. On the one hand, commodity prices are 
declining meaning a lower unit value for exports. On the other hand, the decline in oil prices will 
also cause a downward movement in the import unit values. The fifth section examines the 
behaviour of capital flows. The sixth section deals with institutional developments. In particular, 
this section focuses on the Law of Commerce and Development, which is an extension of the 
CBI Act, the Doha Ministerial Conference and the regulations for the offshore banking sector. 
The final section outlines the possible channels of transmission from the global economy 
developments to the Caribbean economies.
1. The weakening of world economic growth
During 2000-2001, world economic growth registered a slowdown. The slowdown in 
growth originated in the United States and is also affecting, with differing degrees of intensity, 
other industrialised countries. Since the second quarter of 2000, without exception, all major 
industrialised economies have decreased their rates of growth. Between the second quarter of 
2000 and the second quarter of 2001, the rates of growth of the United States, Europe and the 
United Kingdom have decreased by 4 per cent 2.8 per cent and 1 per cent respectively (see, 
Table 1).
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The downturn has not yet translated into greater overall unemployment rates (see Table 
2). It has impacted mostly telecommunications, computer services and airline industries. That is, 
industries that are likely to employ a more highly educated section of the workforce. In this 
sense the current recession will perhaps be “a recession for the educated” .1
Preliminary studies carried out for the United States suggest that the unemployment rate 
for those with a college education is higher that for those with a high school diploma. If the 1994 
unemployment rate (6 per cent) is taken as a reference rate, its distribution among college 
graduates, those with high school diplomas, but no college and those without high school 
diplomas, was 2.6 per cent, 5.3 per cent, 9.8 per cent, respectively. By comparison, in September 
2000 those rates were 1.9 per cent, 3.4 per cent, and 6.2 per cent. Between July and November 
2001, the unemployed rate for college graduates had returned to its 1994 level. In contrast, the 
unemployment rate for those without a high school diploma had only increased to 7.5 per cent 
and was still below its 1994 level.
The decreasing growth trend has resulted in a downward revision of growth projections 
for all economic regions. The global growth forecast has been cut from 2.6 per cent for the 
current year to 2.4 per cent while that of the United States has been decreased from 1.3 per cent 
to 1.1 and for Europe the growth rate has been revised downwards from 1.8 per cent to 1.7 per 
cent. In the case of developing countries the forecasted growth rate has decreased by 0.3 per cent 
percentage points. For Latin America and the Caribbean the growth rate estimated initially at 1.7 
per cent, is now thought to be within the 1 per cent growth range (see Table 3).




Quarterly growth in major industrialised economies 
First quarter 1999 to second quarter 2001
Country and country grouping 1999.1 1999.2 1999.3 1999.4 2000.1 2000.2 2000.3 2000.4 2000.1 2000.2
Canada 4.73 5.05 5.38 5.09 5.03 4.78 4.42 3.51 2.63 2.13
Euro Area 2.00 2.16 2.76 3.59 3.60 3.87 3.21 2.85 2.43 1.67
France 2.80 2.50 2.96 3.73 3.60 3.51 3.37 3.10 2.77 2.31
Germany 0.72 0.97 2.04 3.04 2.95 4.34 3.18 2.48 1.84 0.65
Italy 0.96 1.34 1.39 2.75 3.31 3.02 2.71 2.63 2.54 2.09
Japan -0.38 1.02 2.07 0.44 2.38 0.96 0.34 2.50 0.20 -0.72
United Kingdom 1.81 1.64 2.30 2.75 3.04 3.31 2.74 2.44 2.70 2.31
United States 4.02 3.89 4.02 4.41 4.23 5.22 4.38 2.81 2.55 1.22
Source: Federal Reserve of St. Louis (2001)
TABLE 2
Unemployment rate in major industrialised economies 
First quarter 1999 to second quarter 2001
Country and country grouping 1999.1 1999.2 1999.3 1999.4 2000.1 2000.2 2000.3 2000.4 2000.1 2000.2
Canada 7.90 7.86 7.52 6.97 6.80 6.68 6.92 6.87 6.96 7.00
Euro Area 10.30 10.10 9.80 9.60 9.30 9.00 8.80 8.60 8.40 8.40
France 11.65 11.44 11.02 10.58 10.12 9.65 9.29 8.94 8.64 8.54
Germany 8.75 8.68 8.57 8.39 8.12 7.96 7.84 7.72 7.75 7.83
Italy 11.58 11.46 11.24 11.12 10.96 10.62 10.31 9.99 9.67 9.49
Japan 4.62 4.72 4.72 4.67 4.80 4.68 4.65 4.80 4.75 4.86
United Kingdom 6.27 6.10 5.97 5.97 5.84 5.56 5.44 5.33 5.14 5.04
United States 4.28 4.27 4.22 4.10 4.05 4.00 4.02 3.98 4.23 4.48






Regions and countries Forecast Forecast
November 2001 October 2001
2001 2002 2001 2002
World output 2.4 2.4 2.6 3.5
United States 1.1 0.7 1.3 2.2
European Union 1.7 1.4 1.8 2.2
Japan -0.9 -1.3 -0.5 0.2
Developing countries 4.0 4.4 4.3 5.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.87 1.9 1.7 3.6
CARICOM 1.5. 2.0 2.0 2.2
Asia 5.6 5.6 5.8 6.2
SEMAE 1.2 2.3 1.7 4.2
Source: IMF (2001); ECLAC (2001).
Note: SEMAE denotes South Asian Emerging Asian Economies.
The United States which had registered an unprecedented expansion lasting 107 months 
since the last business trough (March 1991) eclipsing the economic growth of the 1960s, has 
entered into a recession. A recession is understood as “a period during which output growth is 
significantly below that of productive potential, so that unemployment rises” (Godley, 2001). 
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research Business Cycle Dating Committee that 
keeps the record of business cycle, the recession started in March 2001. The 11 September 
attacks have most likely deepened the recession as consumers have reduced their spending 
following the attacks and businesses reduced their employed workforce.
According to the latest figures, the United States GDP declined by -1.1 per cent in the 
third quarter of 2001. According to the report issued by the United States Department of 
Commerce, the downturn reflected a deceleration in personal consumption expenditures (1.1 per 
cent in the third quarter of 2001 versus 2.5 per cent in the second quarter), a decrease in 
government expenditure (0.1 per cent for State and local government expenditure in the third 
quarter compared with an increase in 6.6 per cent in the second quarter), a lower than expected 
export growth rate (decrease of 17.7 per cent in the third quarter compared with a decrease of
11.9 per cent in the second quarter) and a decrease in non-residential fixed investment (decrease 
of 9.3 per cent in the third quarter).
In the Euro Area, the GDP growth figures reflect the slowdown in the world economy, 
and its effects on European exports, investment and inventory accumulation (see Table 4). 
Notwithstanding these effects, private consumption will remain the most important and stable 
contributor to real GDP growth mirroring the growth of domestic income, which has been 
enhanced by fiscal stimulus measures in a number of countries. The contribution of net exports
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(i.e., exports minus imports) will remain positive, as lower export growth is expected to be offset 
by reduced import growth. Export growth is expected to decrease from 12 per cent in 2000 to a 
range of 2.4 per cent-5.2 per cent in 2001 and 0.3 per cent-3.5 per cent in 2002. For its part, 
import growth will be reduced from 11 per cent in 2000 to a range between 1.1 per cent-3.7 per 
cent in 2001.
TABLE 4
Projections of selected macroeconomic variables for the Euro area
2000 -  2003
2000 2001 2002 2003
Private consumption 2.6 1.7-2.1 1.2-2.2 1.5-3.1
Government consumption 1.8 1.1-2.3 0.8-1.8 0.8-1.8
Gross fixed capital formation 4.5 -0.6-0.4 -1.0-2.0 1.2-4.4
Exports of goods and services 12.4 2.4-5.2 0.3-3.5 4.0-7.2
Imports of goods and services 10.9 1.1-3.7 0.6-4.0 3.7-7.1
Source: European Central Bank. Monthly Bulletin. December, 2001.
In particular, the economic perspectives of the United Kingdom are of special concern to 
Caribbean countries since it is their second and, in some cases, their first trading partner. For the 
United Kingdom, GDP growth has not experienced a similar decline akin to that of the United 
States. Between the second and third quarter of 2001, output growth declined from 2.3 per cent 
to 2.1 per cent. This performance, due to the decline investment and exports which fell in the 
third quarter of 2001 by 2.7 per cent and 2.3 per cent, will nonetheless affect import growth. A 
weakening of consumer confidence and falling financial wealth will compound these effects.
Following the general trend, Latin American economies will also experience 
deterioration in their overall macroeconomic performance. Latin American GDP will decrease 
from 4 per cent in 2000 to 1 per cent during the current year (see Table 5, below). This 
performance reflects not only the effects of the external environment but also the current 
economic conditions affecting some of the major economies in the region and, in particular, that 
affecting the Argentine economy.
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TABLE 5 
Latin America GDP growth rates 
1995-2002
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001a/ 2002a/
Argentina -2.9 5.5 8.0 3.8 -3.4 -0.5 -2.0 -1.0
Bolivia 4.7 4.5 4.9 5.2 0.5 1.8 0.5 1.5
Brazil 4.2 2.5 3.1 0.1 0.7 4.5 1.8 2.5
Chile 9.0 6.9 6.8 3.6 -0.1 4.9 3.0 3.5
Colombia 4.9 1.9 3.3 0.8 -3.8 2.3 1.8 2.5
Costa Rica 3.7 0.6 5.6 8.2 8.0 1.7 0.5 2.0
Ecuador 3.0 2.3 3.9 1.0 -9.5 2.8 5.5 2.5
El Salvador 6.2 1.8 4.2 3.5 3.4 1.9 1.0 2.0
Guatemala 5.0 3.0 4.4 5.1 3.6 3.1 1.5 2.5
Honduras 3.7 3.7 4.9 3.3 -1.5 4.8 2.3 2.5
Mexico -6.1 5.4 6.8 5.1 3.7 7.0 0.1 1.5
Nicaragua 4.4 5.1 5.4 4.1 7.4 4.7 1.5 2.0
Panama 1.9 2.7 4.7 4.6 3.2 2.8 1.8 1.5
Paraguay 4.5 1.1 2.4 -0.6 -0.1 0.7 1.0 1.5
Peru 8.6 2.5 6.8 -0.5 0.9 3.0 -0.5 3.5
Dominican
Republic
4.7 7.2 8.3 7.3 8.0 7.8 1.5 3.0
Uruguay -2.3 5.0 5.4 4.3 -3.3 -1.7 -1.0 1.0
Venezuela 5.9 -0.4 7.4 0.7 -5.8 4.0 3.2 3.2
Total 1.1 3.6 5.2 2.3 0.2 4.1 0.87 1.85
Source: ECLAC (2001). 
Note: a/= projections.
In 1991 Argentina adopted a currency board to stop a hyperinflationary process. 
However, the Argentinian economy has accumulated an important external debt, which it is 
unable to service due to low export and output growth. Argentina’s external debt equals 50 per 
cent of GDP and its total debt (internal and external) is estimated at $155 billion which is more 
than five times its annual exports.
The current spread between the interest rate earned on United States treasury bonds and 
that obtained on Argentine sovereign bonds measures the risk of holding a bond for which the 
government will be unable to pay its debt. The spread between Argentine sovereign bonds and 
United States treasury bonds has reached 30 per cent which, according to financial analysts, may 
signal a probable default by Argentine authorities.
So far, the Argentine Government has avoided debt default by implementing strict 
financial and fiscal measures. These include the temporary freeze of current account deposits, 
cuts in pension funds, government expenditure and the rolling over of debt obligations. The 
latest restrictive measures consist of the reduction of expenditure costs by $9 billion as part of a
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plan to balance the budget. To a large extent, the current problem is the combination of fiscal 
profligacy with a stringent monetary rule. The monetary rule consists of the backing of most of 
the currency issued with dollar reserve or dollar denominated assets. In the face of foul weather 
external factors, the currency board arrangement imposes a pro-cyclical fiscal policy, which can 
aggravate economic fluctuations. The authorities have resisted the temptation to devalue due to 
its effects on the value of assets and the growing debt of the population and businesses in foreign 
currency.
Argentina’s woes have contributed to the deceleration of another Latin American major 
economy, namely Brazil. The Brazilian Central Bank has tightened its monetary stance 
increasing interest rates to avoid further currency depreciation. This, in turn, will negatively 
affect investment and consumption. In addition, Brazil is suffering from a drought-triggered 
energy crisis thus starving one of its main engines of economic growth in the past year. Between 
2000 and 2001, Brazil’s GDP growth is expected to decrease from 4.5 per cent to 1.8 per cent.
For its part Mexico is also expected to worsen its economic outlook as the growth in 
exports, the most dynamic variable in recent years, registers the effects of the decline in the 
United States demand. Mexican exports to the United States represent 85 per cent of its global 
exports.
2. A transitory phase of the business cycle or a protracted recession?
As pointed out, the effects following the 11 September attacks have magnified the current 
recession. However, the nature of the recession still remains to be identified. The expectation is 
that world growth in the years 2001 and 2002 will remain weak but that the recovery should be 
underway by the year 2003. However, as in the recent past, these projections are subject to a 
high degree of uncertainty.
Determining whether the recession is part of a business cycle and will be short lived, or 
whether it reflects structural imbalances in the United States economy (which have spread to the 
rest of the world) and is likely to be a long protracted one, is of crucial importance to developing 
economies and the Caribbean region. This will determine the policy mix chosen to deal with the 
possible effects of the current recession.
A short-term economic slump may only require temporary countercyclical measures and 
buffer stock mechanisms to deal with the macroeconomic disequilibria. The short run recession 
hypothesis identifies the decline in demand for the information and communication technologies 
and the lagged impact of the decline in oil prices as major causes of the recession. The terrorist 
attacks of 11 September deepened the economic downturn by adding more uncertainty to the 
current situation.
A long-term recession is a more delicate and complex issue. It will mean a reorientation 
of policy and outlining strategies for more in-depth types of reforms. According to the 
proponents of this hypothesis (Godley and Izurieta -  2001), the United States experienced an 
unprecedented expansion in the 1990s that was aided by supply side factors. However, the
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corresponding structure of aggregate demand was based on the accumulation of debt and 
provided a weak foundation for the economic expansion of the 1990s.
During the 1990s GDP growth (3.0 per cent during the 1990s) was on average similar to 
that of the 1980s but with the lowest fluctuation since the 1950s. The unemployment rate 
followed a similar pattern. The stable behaviour was permitted, in part, by the absence of supply 
side shocks. The rate of technological advance, proxied by productivity growth, showed a 
smooth advance as shown by the low volatility of productivity growth. In turn, productivity 
growth reflected the advances made in information technology. As well, energy and food price 
shocks, prominent during earlier decades, were simply absent or unimportant during the 1990s. 
The worst supply side shock of the 1990s, due to the effects of the Gulf War, was less than one- 
fourth as large as the effect of the oil price shock that took place in the 1970s (see Table 6 
below).
Significant energy and food price shocks raise costs and these are translated, in turn, into 
higher prices. The monetary authority has then the choice of contracting aggregate demand to 
fight inflation at the risk of provoking higher unemployment rates or expanding aggregate 
demand to avoid raising unemployment but at the risk of producing a higher actual and expected 
inflation outcome.
In other words, supply side shocks imply a trade-off between employment and growth for 
the monetary authority. When supply side shocks are not a relevant issue for the design and 
implementation of economic policy, the authorities do not face such a trade off and can achieve 
simultaneously price and output stability and growth.
TABLE 6
Selected macroeconomic indicators, 1950-1990 
Averages and standard deviation
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
GDP growth average 4.2 4.4 3.3 3.0 3.0
Standard deviation 3.9 2.1 2.8 2.7 1.6
Unemployment rate average 4.5 4.8 6.2 7.3 5.8
Standard deviation 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.1
Productivity growth average 2.8 2.8 2.1 1.5 2.1
Standard deviation 4.3 4.2 4.3 2.9 2.6
Food and energy price shocks -0.12 0.61 -0.51 -0.22
Average Standard deviation 0.45 1.41 0.97 0.50
Source: Mankiw (2001).
Note: The food and energy shock is measured as the Consumer Price Index inflation rate over 12 months
minus the core (that is excluding food and energy) Consumer Price Index inflation rate over the same 
period.
....denotes not available.
While supply side factors were a significant contributing factor to the United States 
economic performance during the 1990s, the demand side exhibited important structural 
imbalances.
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The expansion of aggregate demand that took place during the 1990s was deemed to be 
unsustainable because it relied mainly on the accumulation of internal private and foreign debt. 
The expansion of aggregate demand was made possible by a process of the continuing growth of 
private spending over disposable income, which meant an increasing accumulation of debt by the 
private sector and by an external deficit financed by a growing negative net foreign asset 
position of the United States. According to this view the private sector excess of spending over 
income reached 6.7 per cent of GDP during 2000 and as a result the ratio of private sector debt 
over income has increased steadily reaching more than 1.5 in 2000.
3. Interest rates and fiscal policies
The policy recommendations to engineer a recovery include: (i) policies to raise foreign 
demand; (ii) policies to change the relative prices of imported and exported goods; and (iii) 
countercyclical policies. The most desirable combination is a set of policies to raise internal and 
external demand simultaneously. An increase in internal demand without a concomitant increase 
in exports would further widen the external gap. Also an increase in net exports would preclude 
the need to foster substantial government expenditures. An alternative and, perhaps, 
complementary measure to the increase in export demand is to apply article 12 of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) which allows for the use of non-discriminatory import controls. The 
idea behind these measures is to allow the financial balances of the private sector, the 
government and the external balance of payments position to reach equilibrium over time.
As a reaction to the economic slowdown, to date, most countries have resorted to the 
third type of policy option mentioned above, that is, fiscal stimuli packages and monetary 
flexibility in order to restore a sustainable growth path. The central banks of major industrialised 
economies have reduced short-term interest rates in order to provide a short-run stimulus to 
aggregate demand (see Table 7, below). The short-term rates of interest have decreased in the 
Euro Area from 5.02 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2001 to 4.12 in the third quarter of 2001.
In the United States, between the end of the year 2000 until 6 November 2001, the 
Federal Reserve has lowered the federal funds rate from 6.5 per cent to 2 per cent.2 According to 
a recent statement the Federal Reserve open market committee has referred to the increasing 
uncertainty and concerns about a deterioration in business conditions and abroad as the main 
factors which have dampened economic activity.
In addition, some countries have decided to reinforce the effect that automatic fiscal 
stabilizers can have on output by engineering tax cuts to boost demand. In the United States, as 
a response to the recession, the authorities have put in place a tax rebate, effective July 2001 and 
the Federal Reserve has consistently lowered interest rates. The budget proposal for the fiscal 
year 2002 includes changes in the tax law that would reduce tax revenues over the next decade.
2 The federal funds rate is the rate charged by commercial banks on overnight loans. Through the manipulation of 
the federal reserve funds rate, the Federal Reserve is said to control bank reserve and thus indirectly the money 
supply.
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The proposed package includes substantive reduction in the personal income tax, estate and gift 
taxes and the corporate income tax. These tax cut proposals would start in 2002 and be fully 
effective in 2006. As a share of GDP, the tax cut proposals would average 1.2 per cent over a 10- 
year period.3




Short-term interest rates in major industrialised economies 
First quarter 1999 to second quarter 2001
Country and country 
grouping
1999.1 1999.2 1999.3 1999.4 2000.1 2000.2 2000.3 2000.4 2001.1 2000.2 2000.3
Canada 5.0 4.7 4.82 5.04 5.28 6.12 5.90 5.81 5.10 4.48 3.95
Euro Area 3.09 2.64 2.70 3.43 3.54 4.26 4.74 5.02 4.75 4.59 4.27
Japan 0.49 0.11 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.08 0.27 0.54 0.36 0.04 0.04
United Kingdom 5.50 5.20 5.19 5.89 6.12 6.19 6.12 5.99 5.63 5.23
United States 4.90 4.98 5.38 6.06 6.03 6.57 6.63 6.59 5.26 4.10 3.4
Source: Federal Reserve of St. Louis
TABLE 8
Long-term interest rates in major industrialised economies 
First quarter 1999 to second quarter 2001
Country and country 
grouping
1999.1 1999.2 1999.3 1999.4 2000.1 2000.2 2000.3 2000.4 2001.1 2001.2 2001.3
Canada 5.24 5.49 5.78 6.21 6.20 5.96 5.81 5.72 5.67 5.95 5.90
Euro Area 3.99 4.26 5.05 5.32 5.62 5.43 5.44 5.28 4.99 5.19 5.12
Japan 1.83 1.39 1.79 1.78 1.79 1.71 1.79 1.74 1.39 1.28 1.36
United Kingdom 4.47 4.89 5.45 5.50 5.60 5.30 5.28 5.05 4.81 5.09
United States 5.60 6.04 6.34 6.55 6.54 6.29 6.06 5.85 5.56 5.81 5.59
Source: Federal Reserve of St. Louis
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4. Exchange rates and commodity prices
The behaviour of exchange rates has in, general, been stable as have most non-oil 
commodity prices. Foreign exchange markets have been driven by expectations regarding the 
performance of the United States economy.
Periods of a strong dollar followed by a renewed confidence for economic recovery in the 
United States alternated with periods of a weak dollar amid data releases in the United States 
indicating that the country was entering a recession and that the recession might last longer than 
expected. As a result, with a few exceptions, the bilateral exchange rate between the dollar and 
the currencies of the United States major trading partners has remained broadly stable.
TABLE 9
Main trading partners of the United States and 
bilateral dollar exchange rates variations
Country Market share of 
US imports
May 2001-May 2001 





(rates of change in 
bilateral exchange 
rates)
Canada 19 3.0 3.2
Japan 13 12.4 12.3
Mexico 11 -3.4 -3.0
European Union 10 -3.4 3.9
China 8 0.0 0.0
Taiwan 3 7.9 6.4
South Korea 3 16.0 10.9
United Kingdom 4 -5.5 0.7
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2001); MAGIC (2001).
Note: a - sign indicates an appreciation of the dollar and a + sign a depreciation of the dollar.
As shown in Table 9 above, the only trading partners that have experienced significant 
exchange rate variations in their currency with respect to the dollar have been Japan and South 
Korea. Japan accounts for 13 per cent of all United States imports and South Korea accounts for 
3 per cent. The exchange rate fluctuations in the yen/dollar exchange rate respond mainly to the 
deflationary trends in the Japanese economy. Japan has now been in recession for 10 years and 
the successive fiscal and monetary measures to revamp the stagnant Japanese economy have so 
far been unsuccessful. During the second quarter of 2001, Japan registered negative growth rates 
and is expected to achieve a zero growth rate by the year 2002.
For its part the movements of the terms of trade are influenced by two contradicting 
tendencies. On the one hand, the prices of non-oil commodities which are of concern to
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Caribbean countries have exhibited, for the most part, a downward trend reflecting a 
deterioration in the unit value for primary commodity exports (see Table 10 below).
TABLE 10 
























113.5 91.2 88.3 100.4 104.5 100.8 123.2
Coffee Cents/
kg
229.1 176.4 157.5 146.7 146.4 129.7 129.7
Rice $/mt 248.4 184.8 185.6 181.3 165.4 170.2 173.5
Bananas
EU
$/mt 850.4 611.0 628.2 910.2 834.9 686.0 650.8
Bananas
USA










46.60 42.09 47.56 47.44 46.96 46.78 47.02
Tin Cents/
kg
540.4 537.4 526.2 511.3 490.8 398 404.2
Zinc Cents/
kg
107.6 117.7 107.2 102.0 93.4 82.6 77.3
Source: World Bank (2001)
Note: Coffee prices are price quotations for Arabica coffee. Sugar EU refers to the European Union 
negotiated import price for raw unpacked sugar from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) under the 
Lomé Convention. Sugar (US) refers to the CIF import price quoted in the futures market in New York. 
Bananas (EU) refers to the European CIF price quotation for major brands. 
mt= metric tonnes.
On the other hand, the expected decrease in oil prices will lower the unit value of 
imports. Depending on whether the decline in commodities’ export prices are offset or not by the 
decline in oil import prices, the evolution of the terms of trade may be favourable or 
unfavourable to non-oil producing developing countries.
The behaviour of oil prices depends on its demand and supply. Demand has and is likely 
to weaken as a result of the current recession and the 11 September attacks. The downturn of the 
United States economy, which accounted for one third of global consumption in 2000, will have 
an important immediate impact on oil prices. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) members control the supply side of oil prices. During the year, OPEC agreed 
on several production cuts to boost the price of oil but following the 11 September attacks, 
OPEC decided not to modify its quota system (see Table 11, below).
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TABLE 11 
Oil prices, demand and production
1999 2000 2001 2002
Oil price
First quarter 11.26 26.94 25.79 23.45
Second quarter 15.46 26.89 27.38 20.53
Third quarter 20.64 30.34 25.39 20.18
Fourth quarter 24.06 29.67 23.10 21.89
Year 17.86 28.48 25.42 21.51
Oil consumption (percentage of world total)
North America 31.6 31.7 31.5 31.5
Europe 20.2 19.9 19.8 19.7
Latin America 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4
Oil demand and supply balance (million of barrels)
Oil production 74.12 76.74 76.81 77.46
Oil consumption 75.12 75.88 76.22 76.82
Balance -1.09 0.86 0.59 0.64
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2001)
5. Capital flows
Capital flows are now the main driver of economic globalisation. Foreign direct 
investment is now particularly important as a factor in integrating markets and enhancing the 
international production and trade in the world economy. World Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) grew by 18 per cent in 2000, surpassing growth in world production, capital formation and 
trade. FDI inflows jumped to a record $1.3 billion during the year, but are expected to decline 
with the slowdown in the United States, the European Union and Japan - the Triad.
Capital flows to developing countries as a proportion of GDP has declined since the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997. This trend has been induced by a decline in demand for these 
flows in some countries and weak supply to others as a result of high sovereign risk ratings and 
general economic uncertainty. With the contraction in capital flows as a percentage of 
developing counties’ GDP and exports, their debt/GDP and debt/exports have declined. Capital 
flows to developing countries continue to be influenced by strong push and pull factors. A major 
push factor is the increasing financial integration at the global level, catapulted by the 
information and communications revolution. Two important pull factors are economic reform 
and structural changes that attract investors to countries with strengthened business 
environments, offering a cluster of services; and psychological factors, including perceptions of 
risk and uncertainty.
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Aggregate external resources to developing countries declined on average by 2.8 per cent 
per annum between 1997 and 2000. The average contraction in flows reflected the lingering 
effects of the Asian crisis and continued caution on the part of investors in re-entering emerging 
markets. In 2000, however, investor confidence seems to have returned, as inflows increased by 
21.6 per cent over the amount for 1999, to total $ 299.3 billion.
Latin America and the Caribbean continue to be the most heavily dependent on external 
financing of all the major regions. Net resource flows to Latin America and the Caribbean posted 
strong growth over the 1990s, growing from $21.8 billion in 1990 to $ 116.5 billion in 1999. In 
2000, resource flows declined by 12 per cent to $102.4 billion compared with 1999. Of these 
flows, net FDI, which accounted for 74 per cent of total net resource flows in 2000, declined 
during the year. Consequently, net transfers4 to the region contracted by a substantial 40 per cent 
in 2000, amounting to $33.2 billion.
FDI is overwhelmingly the most important component of capital flows to Latin America 
and the Caribbean, far surpassing portfolio flows, both in terms of size and contribution to the 
development process. After a three-fold increase in the second half of the 1990s FDI inflows to 
Latin America and the Caribbean declined in 2000. Inflows fell sharply by 22 per cent to $86 
billion in 2000. Fortunately, this does not represent a negative turning point, but an adjustment 
after the major acquisition of three Latin American firms in 1999.
The pattern and direction of FDI inflows to individual countries is varied depending on 
the levels of development, resource endowment and market incentives, including degrees of 
macroeconomic and financial stability. Brazil remains the largest recipient of FDI inflows in the 
region with inflows going predominantly to the services sector. Although the pace of 
privatisation in Brazil has slowed, it continues to provide impetus for inflows and accounted for 
roughly 22 per cent of total inflows, compared with 28 per cent in 1999. The largest 
privatisation deal in 2000 was the sale of the dominant stake of the bank Banespa to the Spanish 
Banco Santander Central Hispano (BSCH) for $3.6 billion. Underscoring the importance of size 
and economic reforms, Mexico, with $13 billion, was the second most important host country for 
FDI in the region. Importantly, unlike most other major players in the region, Mexico’s inflows 
increased by 10 per cent in 2000. Half of the inflows went to the manufacturing sector, but a 
substantial 31 per cent share was directed to financial services. This resulted from the takeover 
of domestic banks by Spanish banks in the wake of the lifting of the remaining restrictions on 
foreign ownership of banks in 1999.
Argentina and Chile, however, were faced with substantial reductions in FDI inflows in 
2000, reflecting a tapering-off of mergers and acquisitions. The countries had experienced three 
major mergers and acquisitions in 1999 (Repsol’s purchase of YPF in Argentina and Endesa 
España’s acquisition of Endesa and Enersis in Chile). FDI inflows to Colombia and Peru were 
adversely affected by political and economic instability, while inflows increased in Venezuela on 
account of acquisitions in the services sector.
4 Net transfers refer to disbursements or drawings on loan commitments minus debt service payments.
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Some Latin American firms, more so than their Caribbean counterparts, have improved 
their competitiveness and have become more market savvy, enabling them to penetrate 
extraregional markets. In 2000, Chile was the leading outward investor for the region, with 
outflows of $5 billion that exceeded inflows. Most of the investment, however, was undertaken 
by foreign affiliates in Chile. The second largest overseas investment by a Latin American 
company was the acquisition of Cemex from Mexico of Southdown in the United States for $2.8 
billion. This acquisition makes Cemex the third largest company in the world and one of the 
largest transnational corporations (TNCs) in the world.
6. Institutional developments
6.1 The Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Trade Promotion Authority
The CBI (1983) gave a preferential access to a gamut of export products form Caribbean 
and Central American countries to enhance the development and growth of these economies. 
Initially the CBI was set for a period of 12 years ending in September 1995. The law excluded 
textiles and garments, leather products, canned tuna, petroleum and its derivatives.
Due to the disadvantage in the competitive positioning of Caribbean and Latin American 
countries after the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
(1994) and the adverse consequences of Hurricane Mitch for Central American countries, the 
CBI was expanded in May 2000 to include the products that had been excluded in the previous 
legislation. The new legislation titled the Law of Commerce and Development that entered in 
force on October 2000 provides an equal tariff treatment to canned tuna and leather footwear to 
that received by Mexico. In the case of textiles the situation is more complex.
The law allows free of tariff market access and quotas to garments which are elaborated 
in the region with United States fabric and string. It also permits the free market access for 
garments which are cut in the countries that benefit form the CBI but that have United States 
fabric and strings. Furthermore, it allows free market access to the United States of 250 million 
square meters of knitted garments made with fabric from the region and but with United States 
strings. Finally, it allows the free market access of 4.2 million square meters of knitted shirts 
elaborated with regional fabric and United States strings. The quotas of 250 and 4.2 million 
square meters were distributed among Central American and Caribbean economies as shown in 
Table 12 below.
TABLE 12
M arket share of quota distribution of 250 million knitted garments and
4.2 square meters of knitted shirts among CBI beneficiary countries
Country or regional Market share of 250 million Market share of 4.2 million square
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block knitted garments meters of knitted shirts
CARICOM 4.9 5
Costa Rica 7.5 1.5





Dominican Republic 18.1 10
Total 100 100
Note: On the basis of official data.
The Law of Commerce and Development extends the categories of garments that have 
preferential access to the United States import market. The other categories are “807 plus”, 
guaranteed access level and specific limit. The category “807 plus” includes products elaborated 
with United States fabric and strings and which have to pay tariff upon entry into the United 
States territory on only the value added but with no quota restrictions. The guaranteed access 
level category includes those textile products that elaborate with fabric made and cut in the 
United States. Exports that fall under the category of guaranteed access levels are subject to 
quota restrictions and tariffs on their value added. Finally, specific limit export products are 
those textile products elaborated with fabric from any country. This category also includes 
products that are imported by the United States from a third country and which may be re­
exported after undergoing a transformation process. The precise impact of the extended CBI 
initiative on the export and the performance of the beneficiary countries remain uncertain and 
will depend on the unit price of garments, on their export capacity and their potential to fully use 
the assigned quotas to enter the United States market.
However, most recently the CBI trade concessions granted to Caribbean and Central 
American countries have been partly withdrawn by the United States through the approval of the 
trade promotion authority. 5Under the trade promotion authority the United States Congress can 
approve or reject trade treaties but is unable to amend them. Under this authority, granted by the 
United States Congress to the President, the executive branch decided to allow duty-free and 
quota-free entry to the United States market, to apparel sewn in the area only if it is made from 
fabric dyed, printed or finished in United States territory. This withdrawal of export preferences 
to the export of the apparel industry in Caribbean and Central American countries will have an 
important impact on overall export performance. The trade promotion authority also provides 
special treatment for other United States import sensitive products, such as citrus fruits, sugar 
and steel.
6.2 The Doha M inisterial Conference
The fourth WTO Ministerial Conference (Doha, Qatar, 9-14 November 2001) signaled 
the continuation of another round of multilateral trade negotiations. The ministerial conference
5 The trade promotion authority was approved on 6 December 2001.
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gave the WTO a broad negotiation mandate including, among others, negotiations on agriculture, 
services, trade- related aspects of intellectual property rights, dispute settlement, trade and 
environment and electronic commerce. Among the issues in the work programme that will affect 
in particular small developing economies are: (i) the implementation and design of differential 
and special treatment; (ii) the need to examine issues related to the trade of small economies; (iii) 
the recognition to take into account the specific problems confronted by least developed 
countries; (iv) the possible extension of export subsidies; and (v) the waivers granted to the 
European Union to extend the regime of preferential tariff treatment for products which originate 
in ACP countries.
Following a proposal made by several developing economies to change the 
implementation and design of special and differential treatment (WT/GC/W/442), the ministers 
reaffirmed that the provisions for special and differential treatment are an integral part of the 
WTO agreements and agreed to review these provisions with a view to make them more precise, 
effective and operational. The Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment 
proposes an outline of some of the initial issues that should be contemplated in a special and 
differential framework agreement. These are:
(i) The mandatory and binding nature of Special and Differential treatment shall be 
mandatory;
(ii) The inclusion of the development dimension in trade agreements and the extent to 
which they facilitate the attainment of development targets;
(iii) The undertaking of the evaluation of the implications of any future agreement, 
with respect to implementation costs in terms of financial, capacity building and technical 
assistance;
(iv) The provision of a link between the transition periods and the economic 
objectives (debt level, level of industrial development, human development index, etc.) and 
social (literacy and life expectancy) criteria; and
(v) Allowing the undertaking of policies which promote growth and development in 
developing countries.
The Doha declaration only makes reference to the cited document and only addresses special 
and differential treatment in a very broad manner.
Regarding the need to examine the issues of trade in small economies, the Doha 
declaration deprives the ‘smallness’ of an economy of any meaningful sense since it does not 
qualify or quantify the characteristics of a small economy. Perhaps this approach to small 
economies trade issues is justified by the fact that the WTO does not want to create an additional 
subcategory of country members. This would imply changing the trade negotiation process as 
well as amending most multilateral trade negotiation agreements. Also it would imply 
partitioning special and differential treatment into that afforded to developing economies, least
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developed countries and small economies adding a further degree of complexity to the trade 
negotiation process.
The Doha ministerial declaration recognises the need to eliminate tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to expand the trade and market access possibilities of least developed countries. As well 
it makes reference to the Integrated Framework for Trade Related Technical Assistance 
(WT/LDC/HL/Rev.1, 23 October, 1997) as a viable model for development. The integrated 
framework seeks to provide assistance in areas that are key for developing economies. These 
include: institution building to handle trade policy areas, the strengthening of export supplies 
capabilities, trade support services, and trade facilitation capabilities, training and human 
resource development and the assistance in the creation of a supportive trade-related regulatory 
and policy framework to encourage trade and investment. The question remains of the precise 
commitments that countries are willing to take to ensure the necessary aid and the conditionality 
involved in this aid. In fact, the issue of the conditions attached to the delivering of the aid could 
mean a return to the discussions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during 
the 1960s and the appended part IV that created a normative framework for developing 
countries’ needs.
The WTO agreement on Export Subsidies and Countervailing Measures granted an 
extension of eight years (1994-2003) to developing countries to dismantle export subsidies. It 
also allowed countries with a GNP below US$1,000 to continue the use of export subsidies until 
their GNP per capita was greater than that amount. Export subsidies are considered to include 
any financial contribution of a government or public body. This implies that financial transfers 
as well as the absence of tax collection by the government is considered to be a subsidy. Latin 
American and Caribbean countries can use the time extension granted by the agreement to foster 
the development of export enclaves, including especially the development of the garment 
industry. Between the entry of force of the agreement and the Doha Ministerial Conference, 
Latin America did not provide any transitional agreement or restructure their enclave industries 
to eliminate and withdraw export subsidies. Following the Doha Ministerial Conference, 
extensions will be granted to export subsidy programmes in the form of full or partial import 
duties and external taxes. As a result, developing countries will continue to enjoy special 
privileges to develop free trade zones exports. The question remains whether countries will take 
advantage of the new time extension to develop subsidies, which are WTO compatible, or 
whether the time extension will only prolong the present state of affairs.
Finally, the Doha Ministerial Conference decided to allow the European Community to 
provide preferential tariff treatment for products originating in ACP States without being 
required to extend the same treatment to like products of any other member. In this sense, the 
Ministerial gives the European Community a waiver to comply with Article I of the GATT 
regarding the principle of non-discrimination. The waiver applies to the Cotonou Agreement and 
the case of bananas until 31 December 2007. As well, from 1 January 2002 and until 31 
December 2005, paragraphs 1 and 2 of article XIII of the GATT 1994 are waived regarding the 
European Community separate tariff quota of 750 000 tonnes for bananas of ACP origin. These 
last two provisions throw some doubt on the resolutions of the Ecuador Panel which was formed 
to examine the compatibility of the multilateral trade agreements with the European Union-ACP 
export regime. The Ecuador panel ruled that the European Union-ACP regime was in fact
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incompatible with article XIII of GATT and forced the European Union to look for an eventual 
alternate export regime. The granting of the waiver still means the eventual and gradual erosion 
of trade preferences which will mean for Caribbean countries a process of reforming and 
restructuring their traditional exports and perhaps their industrial potential.
6.3 Offshore banking regulations
Money laundering and other illegal practices have become rather problematic for the 
world economy. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) estimates that the scale of money 
laundering transactions was between 2 to 5 per cent of GDP in 1998. Further, it is believed that 
Gresham’s law clearly operates with bad money driving out the good leading to lasting damage 
to financial systems.
Individual Caribbean countries continue to face mixed perceptions with respect to their 
efforts to combat money laundering and being used as clandestine tax havens. Currently, four 
countries in the region are still on the FATF’s blacklist, all of which are Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS) countries -Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis and Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines. Meanwhile, the Bahamas, Cayman Islands and Panama have been delisted 
after undertaking required reforms. In spite of the fact that some of its members are listed, the 
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) continues to work to upgrade supervision, 
regulation and disclosure requirements in the regional jurisdictions.
Most of the countries are in various stages of implementing the 25 criteria of the 
international FATF. Measures that have been implemented include self-assessment of the 
implementation of recommendations for reform, ongoing mutual evaluation of members and 
coordination of training and technical assistance programmes. The CFATF has also undertaken 
a series of typology exercises to examine the types of money laundering, for example, casino 
gambling and cyber-money and to design countermeasures suited to each type. Legislation has 
also been upgraded in most countries to deal with money laundering. For example, variations of 
the Proceeds of Criminal Conduct and Regulation Acts have been implemented in most countries 
to criminalise dealing and benefiting from money laundering activity. Further, there is now a 
team of legal, financial and law enforcement persons tracking the performance of individual 
countries in respect of compliance.
In the OECS, the role of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) has been enhanced 
to deal with some aspects of regulation of offshore centres. Efforts are also being made to adopt 
a variant of the Basle Committee Standards on banking regulation to the offshore sector which 
balances the need for secrecy with the public interest in disclosure. This is not expected to be an 
easy task, however.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attack in the United States, the CFATF has listed the fight 
against terrorism as a major objective. This would be done, largely by preventing terrorists from 
funneling resources through regional centres. Measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation 
in information sharing enhanced supervisory powers and customer due diligence, including 
know-your-customer systems have been stepped up.
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With reference to international cooperation, however, it is vital to note that capacity 
constraints in terms of expertise, finance and legal skills are major impediments to progress in 
implementing reform in the region. International agencies need to assist where they can to bring 
the region on board
7. Global developments and the implications for Caribbean economies
What do these problems in the major trading partners and the forecasted recession in the 
United States and probably the world economy portend for the Caribbean? For one thing, there 
is no clear sense of how these events are likely to play out with any precision. Nonetheless, the 
current and projected global slowdown will have significant implications for the performance of 
Caribbean economies and the conduct of macroeconomic policy and a first approximation 
assessment can be made based on the past experiences with recessions in major trading partners.
The decline in external demand will directly affect the growth of Caribbean exports of 
goods. The extent of the impact will be determined partly by institutional developments 
described in Section 6 and the sensitivity of Caribbean exports to variations in external demand.
The effects of the slow export growth coupled with their high propensity to import will, 
other things being equal, widen the trade gap. Table 13 shows the average propensity to import 
of Caribbean countries (measured by the ratio of the rate of change in imports relative to the rate 
of change in income) and their export performance (measured by the ratio of exports to the 
average import propensity). Depending on whether or not the expected decline in the price of oil 
compensates the decrease in the export prices of basic commodities, the variation in the terms of 
trade may soften or exacerbate this effect.
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TABLE 13
Import propensity and export performance ratio for selected Caribbean
countries
1990-2000
1990 1993 1996 1999 2000
Barbados 
Import propensity 42.3 36.9 44.0 47.8 41.5
Export performance ratio 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 2.8
Belize
Import propensity 52.1 52.9 42.2 55.0
Export performance ratio 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.8
Dominica
Import propensity 86.2 61.9 60.8 65.1
Export performance ratio 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
Grenada 
Import propensity 54.1 53.3 59.7 57.9 62.4
Export performance ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5
St. Kitts and Nevis
Import propensity 69.7 54.4 53.5 44.4 63.9
Export performance ratio 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3
Saint Lucia 
Import propensity 65.3 53.0 46.8 46.0 51.6
Export performance ratio 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
Trinidad and Tobago 
Import propensity 24.9 30.6 37.2 49.1 41.5
Export performance ratio 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.8
St.Vincent & the Grenadines
Import propensity 64.3 49.5 46.0 54.0 42.0
Export performance ratio 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5
Source: On the basis of official data 
Note: Denotes not available.
The services balance is also likely to be reduced although the final outcome will depend 
on a series of factors. First, there is the risk factor. Tourism receipts originating in the United 
States will decrease due to the lower number of tourists visiting the region as their perception of 
risk of travelling increases. However, the decrease in American tourism may be partly offset by 
more dynamic tourism flows emanating from Europe. Europeans may, in fact, view Caribbean 
destinations as a lesser risk than travelling to other destinations, such as the Middle East. 
Second, airlines have been trimming down their airline flights to the region. Third, the increase 
in insurance and other costs for commercial airlines following the 11 September attacks will 
place an additional restriction on tourist flows as airlines fares are increased or the number of 
flights reduced.
As it now stands, hotel occupancy rates in a number of countries have fallen to about 15 
per cent, relative to average rates of 60 per cent in September-October (International Monetary 
Fund - IMF). Indeed, the significant fall in visitor arrivals and weak commodity prices for
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bananas, sugar and apparel have exacerbated the current account deficit of the balance of 
payments in 2000. Preliminary estimates indicate that the external financing gap of the region 
could widen to between $1-2 billion -2 to 4 per cent of GDP in 2002 (see IMF).
Regarding the service balance account of the balance of payments, it is important to note 
that the offshore financial services sector, which was already under pressure from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is likely to face even more 
pressure in the wake of the terrorist attacks, reducing activity and income.
A widening of the trade gap and a narrowing services balance surplus are likely to create 
a current account constraint.
Within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) subregion, the external current account 
recorded an average deficit of $170.4 million in 2000, the equivalent of 9.7 per cent of GDP. 
The performance of individual countries was quite mixed, reflecting the viability of 
macroeconomic performance, exports and imports and income flows and transfers. The current 
account deficit expanded in most countries in 2000 compared with 1999 (see Table 14, below). 
The Bahamas swung from a substantial current account surplus of $406.1 million to an even 
larger deficit of $560.3 million in 2000. Barbados also displayed a similar pattern moving from 
a surplus of $147 million to a deficit of $111.9 million. Growth in the deficit was also significant 
in Belize, Guyana and Suriname. Incidentally, the OECS member countries and Jamaica posted 
the smallest growth in their deficits.
In the first half of 2001, the current account position of most countries worsened, with 
improvements in only the Bahamas, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. Barbados’ current 
account surplus increased from $27 million in the first half of 2000 to over $60 million in the 
corresponding period of 2001. This improvement reflected the collapse in all categories of 
imports on account of a decline in growth. In Trinidad and Tobago, the current account 
strengthened from a deficit of $59 million in the first quarter of 2000 to a surplus of $377 million 
in the first quarter of 2001. The robust position of Trinidad and Tobago reflected the turnaround 
in merchandise account that was bolstered by strong petroleum receipts due to vibrant exports 
and prices. The Bahamas’ current account improved on the basis of a 7 per cent growth in 
export receipts and an over 20 per cent decline in imports. As for other countries, this points to 
the importance of import compression as a mechanism for adjusting to the weakening output 
performance in most countries of the region.
Guyana’s current account deficit widened in the first semester of 2001, relative to the 
similar period of 2000 on account of weakening prices of its major commodity exports. High oil 
prices and declining commodity receipts resulting in worsening current account deficits also 
buffeted Suriname and Jamaica.
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TABLE 14
CARICOM: External Current Account (US$ million)
Projections
Countries 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Bahamas -179.4 37.5 49.7 -41.6 -148.2 -269.3 -665.1 -995.7 406.1 -560.3 -235.3 n.a. n.a.
Barbados -23.4 143.4 70.2 134.7 90.2 104.5 -49.4 -55.9 147.5 -111.9 -108.9 -83.1 -88.6
Belize 26.6 29.1 -49 -20.3 7.3 2.3 -14.4 -41.8 -67.2 -128.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guyana -118 -146.7 -136.4 -100.8 -94.9 -20.2 -105.1 -98.5 -75.2 -117.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Jamaica -225.8 10.9 -194.2 135.8 -192.3 -237.8 -310.6 -255.8 -252.1 -285.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
EC Currency 
Union
-291.5 -203.2 -565.5 -237.4 -210.9 -336.5 -404.1 -388.7 -454.4 -465.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Suriname -94.9 -25 21 -237.4 -62.7 -63 -48 -154.8 -52.6 -73 -81 -73 -61
Trinidad and 
Tobago
-20.7 56.6 -107.8 221.4 269.9 68.2 -578.9 -645.3 30.6 378.5 311.2 192.2 366.1
Total -927.1 -97.4 -912 144.5 -341.6 -751.8 -2175.6 -2636.5 -1424.5 -1363.3 -114 36.1 216.5
Source: Caribbean Centre for Monetary Studies, 2001
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The current account can be balanced by an increase in capital flows (private and/or 
official) or by a decrease in aggregate demand. This can be seen from a simple national income 
accounting identity whereby the balance of payments is seen to be equal to the excess of private 
spending over private disposable income and the budget deficit.
(1) Exports -  Imports + Net property income from abroad = [national income -  taxes -  
private expenditure] + [taxes -  public expenditure]
The Caribbean’s experience with net capital inflows has not been as favourable as fast- 
growing Asian economies and Latin America. Nevertheless, the resurgence of capital flows at 
the global level in the 1990s led to growth in inflows to Caribbean countries. The composition 
of aggregate external inflows to the Caribbean has changed in important respects relative to the 
1980s. The region has not been immune from the decline in official development assistance 
(ODA). In fact, the Caribbean was one of the regions hardest hit by the sharp contraction in aid 
flows over the 1990s. Caribbean countries are not important recipients of portfolio capital flows 
due to their underdeveloped capital markets and lack of adequate risk ratings. FDI is by far the 
most important source of capital inflows. This is indeed a welcome feature, since FDI provides 
strategic benefits in terms of production for export and the transfer of technology6, skills and 
management expertise, which are important for the competitiveness of the region.
In recent years, Caribbean countries have been able to finance their current deficits with 
capital inflows, particularly FDI, on relatively good terms. The global slowdown could lead to a 
significant decline in capital inflows and also more discriminating investors. This would raise 
the stakes for Caribbean countries with their relatively poor risk-ratings the result of them being 
little-known in international capital markets. There were already significant downside risks in 
international capital markets before the terrorist attack on the United States. These risks 
stemmed from sluggish output and corporate earnings, weakening equity markets and widening 
yields and spreads in emerging markets. The attack simply amplified these risks, thereby 
making markets even more uncertain. As in the Asian crisis, the major response was a flight to 
quality that raised borrowing costs for the more risky emerging markets. What this means is that 
Caribbean countries might have to borrow on onerous commercial terms to finance worsening 
fiscal and external current account deficits. This has serious implications for the accumulation 
of debt and debt servicing commitments in the future.
A number of Caribbean countries were already enticed to substitute international debt for 
domestic debt with the fall in interest rates in major markets, especially the United States. 
Jamaica, for instance, issued a $200 million bond in 2000 and Trinidad and Tobago also 
undertook external borrowing. Although this debt might have been contracted on soft terms, 
future increases in interest rates in creditor countries could lead to a sharp increase in debt 
service obligations.
Net FDI inflows of $16.3 billion flowed to the Caribbean, including Cuba and the 
Dominican Republic, between 1991 and 2000. FDI inflows averaged around $91 million per
6 See The World Investment Report 2001: “Promoting Linkages”, UNCTAD
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year during the same period. In 2000, however, total FDI inflows declined sharply by over 41 
per cent to $2033 million, relative to the previous year. FDI declined in 13 of the selected 
countries and was up in only six of them. The larger Caribbean countries generally fared better 
than their smaller counterparts in terms of the slowdown in FDI inflows. Inflows to the 
Dominican Republic contracted by over 29 per cent. This probably reflected a decline in 
investment in the free zones. Inflows to Jamaica were down by over 27 per cent in 2000, 
reflecting the continued sluggish sectoral performance, especially the manufacturing sector. 
Inflows fell in Barbados, the OECS countries and Suriname as investor sentiment towards these 
countries weakened. Inflows to Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago increased in 2000. Trinidad 
and Tobago was particularly favoured by continued flows for the LNG plant project in the 
petrochemical sector.
Indications point to an average decline in FDI inflows to the region in 2001. The 
slowdown in growth in the United States and the European Union has increased investor caution 
in these countries and dampened overseas investment. FDI inflows into the tourism sector in the 
Bahamas contracted and the situation was similar for commodities and manufacturing in Jamaica 
and Guyana. Meanwhile, in Barbados the completion of some tourism projects led to a reduction 
in inflows.
In the absence or reduction of foreign capital flows and given the commitment of 
Caribbean countries to foreign exchange rate stability, the balance of payments restriction will 
have to be balanced by a decrease in demand coming from the private or the public sector. 
Ideally, greater export growth or investment would replace the decline in private and public 
expenditure. The former alternative implies a higher export demand or an exchange rate 
depreciation. A higher export demand is unlikely due to the current slump, while an exchange 
rate depreciation is protracted by the exchange rate regime of Caribbean countries aimed at 
maintaining stable if not fixed nominal exchange rates. The latter outcome would imply lower 
rates of interest, which would also put pressure on the exchange rates.
The restriction in aggregate demand will imply a tight fiscal stance. The fiscal stance is 
measured by the ratio of government spending to average rate of taxation (taxes divided by 
GDP). The ratio will equal GDP when the budget is in balance and will be greater (lower) than 
GDP when the budget is in deficit (surplus). The fiscal stance allows making inferences 
regarding the nature of fiscal policy. Table 15 shows the actual GDP and the fiscal stance ratio 
for Caribbean economies. In all cases the excess of the fiscal stance ratio over GDP signals the 
fact that during the 1990s fiscal policy maintained an expansionary nature.7 The present situation 
may force the authorities to take stringent fiscal measures. These in turn may soften the balance 
of payments restrictions but at the cost of higher unemployment and output losses.
To alleviate the onslaught of a global recession, Caribbean countries may need to adjust 
macroeconomic and structural policies. On the macroeconomic front, countries should explore 
the possibility of containing fiscal outlays and manage contingency funds, such as revenue
7 The linkages of the tourism sector with the rest of the economic sectors can also aggravate the fiscal stringency. A 
decrease in tourism activity has a fiscal revenue impact through the reduction in tax revenue of the activities 
connected with tourism.
28
stabilisation funds, prudently. Complementary options include the swapping of international debt 
with domestic debt if  this is less expensive in order to obtain the needed financing.
29
TABLE 15
Fiscal stance of selected Caribbean economies 
1990 -  2000
























































































































































































































Source: On the basis of official data.
Note: GDP is expressed in millions of national currency units.
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